A Bronx Tale: Disposable People, the Legacy of Slavery, and the Social Death of Kalief Browder by Jones, D. Marvin
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review
8-1-2016
A Bronx Tale: Disposable People, the Legacy of
Slavery, and the Social Death of Kalief Browder
D. Marvin Jones
University of Miami School of Law, djones@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law Enforcement
and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Race &
Social Justice Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
D. Marvin Jones, A Bronx Tale: Disposable People, the Legacy of Slavery, and the Social Death of Kalief Browder, 6 U. Miami Race & Soc.
Just. L. Rev. 31 (2016)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umrsjlr/vol6/iss1/4
  31 
A Bronx Tale: Disposable People, the 
Legacy of Slavery, and the Social Death of 
Kalief Browder 
D. Marvin Jones* 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 31 
II. WHAT WAS SLAVERY? .................................................................... 35 
A. Powerlessness ............................................................................ 35 
B. Rightlessness .............................................................................. 37 
C. Invisibility .................................................................................. 38 
D. Social Death ............................................................................... 38 
III. THE SOCIAL DEATH OF KALIEF BROWDER ..................................... 41 
Solitary ............................................................................................ 48 
IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 49 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is early morning May 15, 2010 in the Belmont section of the 
Bronx. Kalief Browder and his friend are on their way home from a 
party.1 He is sixteen. Walking home along Arthur Avenue, “Little 
Italy’s” main street, they pass familiar stores, delis, and bakeries, their 
corrugated aluminum shutters pulled down and pad locked tight. 
                                                                                                             
 *  © Donald Jones, all rights reserved. D. Marvin Jones is Professor of Law at the 
University of Miami. His most recent book is DANGEROUS SPACES: BEYOND THE RACIAL 
PROFILE (Praeger 2016). 
1 The facts of the story are based on the following articles about the incredible case of 
Kalief Browder. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law: A boy was accused of taking a 
backpack. The court took three years of his life. THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (hereinafter Before the 
Law); Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, THE NEW YORKER (June 7, 
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015; Michael 
Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Riker’s Island for 3 years Without 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015),  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-
browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html?_r=0. 
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Suddenly a police car speeds toward them and careens to a stop.2 
More police cars arrive in rapid succession.3 As they stare into the police 
headlights an officer informs them that they are suspects in a robbery.4 
Kalief maintains his innocence as he would unwaveringly for the next 
few years. “I did not rob anyone,” Kalief says.5 “You can check my 
pockets.” The officers conduct the search but come up with nothing.6 An 
officer goes back to talk to the witness in the squad car. Now apparently 
the man in the squad car changes his story. The policeman says the man 
claimed the two youths had robbed him “two weeks ago.”7 
The police arrest Kalief and his friend on the spot.8 Based on the 
uncorroborated allegation of a man in the squad car about a two week old 
robbery, police take Kalief and his friend to the police station and charge 
him with robbery, grand larceny, and assault. His bail was set at 
$3000.00. 9 Kalief’s mother cannot raise that amount. It is completely 
out of reach.10 
Browder found himself aboard a Department of Correction bus. 
“Staring through the grating on the bus window, he watched the Bronx 
disappear. Soon, there was water on either side as the bus made its way 
across a long, narrow bridge to Rikers Island.”11 
The court system in the Bronx is broken. “Defense lawyers are 
notorious for dilatory tactics, prosecutors are often unprepared.”12 The 
majority of criminal cases are disposed of by plea. Browder steadfastly 
refuse to plead guilty, insisting he was innocent. Browder stayed at 
Rikers for three years.13 He spent two of those years in solitary 
confinement.14 During this period, he claims he endured constant 
beatings at the hands of both inmates and guards.15 
In the film 12 Years a Slave, Solomon Northup, a successful 
musician and free man living in Saratoga, is kidnapped by white men and 
                                                                                                             











13 Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 1. 
14 Id. 
15 Gonnerman, supra note 1. 
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clandestinely transported to the slaveholding antebellum south.16 To his 
family and friends Solomon had simply disappeared. 
In a real sense so did Kalief Browder. He became a member of a 
dangerous population whose incarceration defines a boundary between 
the criminal and the respectable, between us and the dangerous threats. 
The fact that Kalief could remain incarcerated at Rikers for three years 
without a trial shows the studied indifference, disregard, and disrespect 
of society for him. It is symptomatic of the studied indifference, 
disregard, and disrespect society has for poor people of color who suffer 
daily the brutal conditions at the jail-prison system at Rikers. 
Northup for the twelve years he was gone would have seemed to 
“disappear.” Browder to his family and friends, out of sight at Rikers, 
may have seemed to disappear as well, a disappearance associated only 
with those who are actually dead and those convicted and imprisoned for 
a felony. 
But Browder was never convicted of anything. There were no 
hearings in any court in which evidence was presented against him. 
There was only the uncorroborated allegation by “a man in squad car” 
that Kalief and his friend had robbed him “two weeks ago” at the time of 
his arrest. And even that story was inconsistent with the police officer’s 
original accusation. 
On this flimsy basis, Browder had been incarcerated and imprisoned, 
invisible apparently to a system which hypocritically holds that justice 
delayed is justice denied. Justice never showed up at all for Browder. 
Justice, like Browder, disappeared for three years. Browder spent two 
years of the three years he was incarcerated—without trial—in solitary 
confinement. He was forced to accept conditions of hyper-isolation, 
which were particularly inhumane, for two years of his life. And he had 
to accept that this was happening without ever having a day in court, 
without ever having an opportunity to confront witnesses, without ever 
being treated as a citizen with rights. The injustice of something like this 
happening to anyone seems unbelievable, fantastic. In Birth of a 
Nation’hood: Gaze, Script and Spectacle in The O.J. Simpson Case,17 
Toni Morrison talks about the “sudden transformation of the 
unbelievable into belief.”18 Browder would have to believe, that the 
unbelievable thing had happened, and that it had happened to him 
The shock of this transition would have been maddening to anyone. 
                                                                                                             
16 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Fox Searchlight 2013). 
17 TONI MORRISON, BIRTH OF A NATION’HOOD: GAZE, SCRIPT, AND SPECTACLE IN THE 
O.J. SIMPSON CASE (2010). 
18 Id. 
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After his release Kalief became “afraid of being attacked on the 
subway and that his TV was watching him.19 He was afraid to go out of 
the house for fear of being attacked. 
He did make halting steps to create a future for himself. While in 
college he writes an essay in which he details the dehumanizing and 
psychologically destructive effects of solitary confinement. It was 
prophetic. “On June 6, 2015 about 12:15 p.m. “[Browder] went into 
another bedroom, pulled out the air conditioner, and pushed himself out 
through the hole in the wall, feet first, with a cord wrapped around his 
neck.”20 
Browder’s mother was the only other person home at the time. After 
hearing a loud thump, she went upstairs to look for her son but he wasn’t 
there. When she went outside she saw that he had hanged himself.21 
Officially Browder’s death was listed as a suicide. But I question 
that. I argue his death was a homicide. 
Fully situated members of the community have rights, and if they 
were incarcerated, they would not wait three years to get a trial. But 
those who are black, poor, and in urban spaces live in a kind of social 
limbo where they are not considered worthy of the same level of 
recognition, social protection, or rights. They are always and already 
depersonalized. They are disposable in the sense that when they are 
falsely arrested or incarcerated for years without trial or killed, there is 
routinely no accountability—their lives don’t matter. Said another way, 
what made Kalief’s treatment possible is that the Kalief Browders are 
invisible to the legal system and effectively right-less persons. They are 
socially dead. 
My essay will unfold in three parts. First I explore the meaning of 
social death. The concept of social death is borrowed from Orlando 
Patterson’s work Slavery and Social Death.22 In effect I argue that 
Browder experienced a status which was both the legacy of slavery and 
comparable to it: he was socially dead. To appreciate this analogy, we 
will explore social death as it applies to the status of the slave. Second, 
we will discuss how the conditions and treatment Browder received 
reproduced phenomenologically the conditions of slavery. Finally, I will 
argue that these conditions led directly to his death. 
                                                                                                             
19 Nisha, Kalief Browder Hangs Himself After Spending Three Years on Riker’s Island 
Without Trial, THE SOURCE (June 9, 2015), http://thesource.com/2015/06/09/kalief-
browder-hangs-himself-after-spending-three-years-on-rikers-island-without-trial/. 
20 Schwirtz & Winerip, supra note 1. 
21 Id. 
22 ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH (Harvard Univ. Press 1985). 
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II. WHAT WAS SLAVERY? 
Positioned at the edge of social life, neither included nor expelled, 
the slave is “in a permanent condition of liminality” and must forever 
mourn his own social death.23 
A. Powerlessness 
Slavery was first of all a relation of total domination of man by man. 
“The slave was a dominated thing, an animated instrument, a body with 
natural movements, but without its own reason, an existence entirely 
absorbed in another.”24 The power of the master was absolute: 
the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his 
posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the 
capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that 
another may reap the fruits . . . such services can only be 
expected from one who has no will of his own; who 
surrenders his will in implicit obedience to that of 
another. Such obedience is the consequence only of 
uncontrolled authority over the body. There is nothing 
else that can operate to produce the effect. 25 
More specifically what does the absolute power of the master mean 
from the perspective of the slave? The slave was first of all powerless to 
control his own body. The master could command the slave to stand, or 
sit, or walk, or work, for how long. The master decided if he wanted to 
use the slave’s body for sexual purposes or for any other purpose. 
I was called up on one of her [Miss Ada’s] birthdays, 
and Marster [sic] Bob sorta looked out of de corner of 
his eyes, first at me and then at Miss Ada, and then he 
make a little speech. He took my hand, put it in Miss 
Ada’s hand, and say: “Dis your birthday present, darlin’” 
I make a curtsy and Miss Ada’s eyes twinkle like a star 
and she take me in her room and took on powerful over 
me.26 
Ultimately the master controlled the slave’s mind as well as his 
body, “such methods make the psyche of the oppressed the focus of 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 State v. Mann, 13 N. C. 263 (1 Dev.) (1829) (per curiam). 
26 PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 12. 
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control and domination.”27 Thus, Ruffin says flatly, “the slave has no 
will of his own . . . the slave surrenders his will in implicit obedience to 
another.”28 The slave was a machine of flesh and blood controlled by the 
master’s commands, “in a perfect state of slavery they could become if 
guided by the master’s rational will, something like machines or 
prosthetic devices.29 Thus in the motion picture Twelve Years a Slave the 
master at various times rapes, whips, works, or commands Patsy (Lupita 
Nyong’O) to dance for his amusement.30 This power of absolute control 
over the body of the slave emanated from several sources, the most 
important of which was the threat of violence against the slave. 
To effectuate this power, the law placed no constraints on the how 
much force the master could use or how to use it. As Judge Ruffin wrote, 
“The power of the master must be absolute to render the submission of 
the slave perfect.”31 Similarly, Patterson writes, “The master’s absolute 
power and the slave’s total powerlessness rested on the use and threat of 
violence.”32 All societies come into being through violence. For fully 
situated members of the community, violence crystallizes into law, 
which are rules backed by threats—symbolic violence. For the slave 
direct violence created the status of slavery: 
“the slave’s powerlessness originated or was conceived 
of as having originated as a substitute for death usually 
violence death. . The condition of slavery did not . . . 
erase the prospect of death . . . it was a conditional 
commutation. The execution was suspended only as long 
as the slave acquiesced in his powerlessness. The master 
was essentially a ransomer. What he bought or acquired 
was the slave’s life.33 
From moment to moment the slave was forced to choose between 
their slave status—powerlessness—and death. 
Violence also maintained the slave relationship. Given the inhuman 
conditions of slave life, it was necessary to continually to repeat the 
                                                                                                             
27 Id. 
28 Supra note 25. 
29 BENJAMIN REISS, THE SHOWMAN AND THE SLAVE: RACE, DEATH AND MEMORY IN 
BARNUM’S AMERICA 121 (2001). 
30 12 YEARS A SLAVE (Fox Searchlight 2013). 
31 State v. Mann, 13 N. C. at 266; See also D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX AND 
SUSPICION: THE MYTH OF THE BLACK MALE 154 (Praeger 2005). 
32 HUSSEIN ABDILAHI BULHAN, FRANTZ FANON AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPPRESSION 
122 (1985); PATTERSON, supra note 22. 
33 PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 5. 
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original, violent act of transforming a free man into slave.”34 As George 
P. Rawick writes, “whipping was not only a method of punishment. It 
was a conscious device to impress upon the slaves that they were slaves; 
it was a crucial form of social control particularly if we remember it was 
difficult for slaves to run away peacefully.”35 
B. Rightlessness 
In 12 Years a Slave Northup was imprisoned in a cellar about 
twelve-feet-square. Steps led up from the cellar into a yard surrounded 
by a brick wall ten or twelve feet high immediately in the rear of a 
building of the same width as itself.36 Hidden behind a building which 
appeared to be a residence, and behind a ten to twelve foot wall, is the 
underground slave pen where Northup was held. This pen is physically 
invisible to the larger society. This is a metaphor for the fact that the 
slave was invisible to the law, behind a kind of iron curtain belonging to 
no community and having no rights. This rightlessness is the 
concomitant to the powerlessness of the slave at the hands of the master 
under the law of slavery. Thus Chief Justice Taney could say, “They had 
for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior 
order; and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in 
social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect.”37 
This was conceptualized by the notion that the slave was property. 
“The slave-code . . . of the Southern States is designed to keep millions 
of human beings in the condition of chattels personal; to keep them in a 
condition in which the master may sell them dispose of their time, 
person, and labour . . . ”38 A corollary here the slave had no right to his 
body, his labor, or himself. Thus William Gödel could say, “Having no 
right to himself, to his bones, muscles, and intellect (being all of them 
property of his “owner”), [the slave] has no right to his own 
industry . . .”39 
But property was a metaphor. The key aspect of the relation is that 
the slave was objectified or thingified in order to create the relation of 
absolute domination. “Not being accounted a person but thing [the slave] 
                                                                                                             
34 PATTERSON, supra note 22, at 3; see also KELLY L. WHRENHAVEN, RECONSTRUCTING 
THE SLAVE: THE IMAGE OF THE SLAVE IN ANCIENT GREECE 70 (2012). 
35 Id. at 70. 
36 Id. at 38. 
37 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). See also D. Marvin Jones, Darkness 
Made Visible: Law Metaphor and the Racial Self, 82 GEO. L. J. 437, 453 (1993). 
38 2 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE WRITINGS OF HARRIET BEECHER STOWE WITH 
BIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTIONS 309 (Cambridge, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., vol. II 1896). 
39 ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS 4 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1992). 
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can have no personal rights to be protected.” Andrew Fede in his book 
thus concludes slaves were people but people without rights. Fede thus 
quotes George Stroud to say, [T]he cardinal principle of slavery was the 
notion that “the slave is to be regarded as a thing—an article of 
property—a chattel personal . . . ”40 
C. Invisibility 
Thirdly, the psychological implications of being defined as and 
treated as an object was a sense of invisibility. By that I mean the sense 
of wandering through life as a ghost, living an existence in which you are 
not only unseen by courts and the law but unseen and invisible to your 
family, friends, and community. It is of course not just being physically 
unseen—as Solomon was in William’s slave pen and on the plantation in 
the south- but a matter of being so erased by one’s lack of social status 
that no one takes notice. Patterson calls it the loss of honor. John Adams 
writes: 
He feels himself out of sight of others, groping in the 
dark. Mankind takes no notice of him. He rambles and 
wanders unheeded. In the midst of a crowd, at church, in 
the market he is as much in obscurity as he would be in a 
garret or a cellar. He is not disapproved, censured, or 
reproached, he is only not seen.41 
While Adams was writing about the “unseen” status of the poor, this 
applies even more powerfully with the slave. The significance of this 
“invisibility” is that the slave is a ghost for social purposes—someone 
existing but not really living. The slave, as a ghost, experienced his 
invisibility as a total negation of any sense of “self-hood.” Henry Louis 
Gates tells a story about a slave who was asked about his “self.” The 
slave replied, “I ain’t got no self.”42 
D. Social Death 
Powerlessness, rightlessness, and invisibility all merged in this 
notion that the slave was socially dead. Social death means that the slave 
was perceived by society and the law as a non-being. 
                                                                                                             
40 Id. 
41 6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WOKS OF THE SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH 
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 239 (Little Brown and Co. 1851). 
42 HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., BEARING WITNESS: SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN AMERICAN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (Pantheon Books 1991); see also JONES, 
supra note 31, at 55. 
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The captive always appears therefore as marked by an 
original, indelible defect which weighs endlessly upon 
his destiny.” This is [marked] in Izard’s words, a kind of 
“social death.” He can never be brought to life again as 
such since, in spite of some specious examples . . . the 
slave will remain forever an unborn being (non-né).43 
Thus Burch changed Solomon’s name. 
When Solomon is first drugged and kidnapped he is turned over to 
Burch who runs the slave depot in Washington. While Solomon was 
asleep, Burch removes Solomon’s clothes, outward traces of his old 
identity, and dresses him up in rags and chains. When Solomon wakes up 
he desperately clings to his identity as a free man: 
I asserted, aloud and boldly, that I was a free man—a 
resident of Saratoga, where I had a wife and children, 
who were also free, and that my name was Northup. I 
complained bitterly of the strange treatment I had 
received, and threatened, upon my liberation, to have 
satisfaction for the wrong.44 
Burch incensed responds by silencing Northup with insults and a 
brutal whipping. 
With blasphemous oaths he called me a black liar, a 
runaway from Georgia . . . Burch ordered the paddle and 
cat-o-nine tails brought in . . . With the paddle Burch 
commenced beating me. Blow after blow was inflicted 
on my naked body. He stopped and asked if I still 
insisted I was a free man. I did insist upon it and then the 
blows were renewed.45 
A man’s name is of course more than simply a way of calling him. It 
is the verbal sign of his whole identity, his being in the world as a 
distinct person. By changing his name, Solomon—the free person—
ceased to exist. He was dead to society as a socially dead thing. Solomon 
was no longer entitled to that identity, to his past, to make decisions for 
himself, to rights, to recognition by others as a human being 
                                                                                                             
43 Patterson, supra note 22, at 38. 
44 SOLOMON NORTHUP, TWELVE YEARS A SLAVE: NARRATIVE OF SOLOMON NORTHUP, A 
CITIZEN OF NEW-YORK, KIDNAPPED IN WASHINGTON CITY IN 1841, AND RESCUED IN 1853, 
FROM A COTTON PLANTATION NEAR THE RED RIVER, IN LOUISIANA 43 (David Wilson ed., 
Miller, Orton & Mulligan 1855). 
45 Id. 
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In slave society the social death of the slave was rationalized in one 
of two ways. Patterson refers to these rationalizations as intrusive or 
extrusive. In the intrusive conception the slave was generally a captured 
enemy. “He stood . . . as a living affront to local gods, an intruder in a 
sacred space.”46 Patterson also states that in this intrusive or intruder 
conception, “a slave was a stranger in a strange land.”47 There is a 
linkage between being an outsider and an enemy. Thus Patterson states, 
“The slave in the city of man remained the archetypical outsider, the 
eternal enemy within in a formalized state of marginality.”48 
The other conception was that the slave was an insider, a member of 
the community “who had fallen.” This later image Patterson calls the 
extrusive conception.49 Here the dominant image of the slave was that of 
an insider who had fallen: One who ceased to belong and had been 
expelled from normal participation in the community because of a failure 
to meet certain minimal legal or socio-economic norms of behavior.50 
This latter notion of social death applies in the case of prisoners. 
Historically prisoners suffered something called civil death. This 
forfeiture of rights, formal rightlessness, was a function of a forfeiture of 
personhood—social death—in the eyes of society. 
There is close connection between being an outsider-intruder-enemy 
and being a member of society who is exposed as a criminal. Both 
become the enemies within and forfeit their social lives. They are both 
socially dead—without freedom—they must always be under control, 
without rights, and without honor or social recognition. 
We think of violence as the act of whipping, or beating, or physical 
abuse. But the great violence of slavery was treating living human beings 
as non-beings, as socially dead. As human beings we need and are 
defined by our freedom to make choices, to have dignity, to have 
relationships with others. I would compare denying a person all these 
things the violent equivalent of trapping someone in a space where there 
is no air to breathe—something akin to being walled up in cave or buried 
alive. 
While Patterson focuses on social death as a function of how society 
saw the slave, there is another dimension which is critical here. The slave 
internalizes the violence of being pronounced socially dead. This means 
being doomed to no freedom, no rights, and no dignity. Thus in the film 
12 Years a Slave, when Solomon is finally rescued and is about to go 
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free, Patsy in the end asks him not to leave her in bondage but to take her 
to the river and kill her. 
III. THE SOCIAL DEATH OF KALIEF BROWDER 
Now here’s a little truth, open up your eyes 
 
While you’re checking out the boom-bap, check the exercise 
 
Take the word “overseer,” like a sample 
 
Repeat it very quickly in a crude voice sample 
 
Overseer, overseer, overseer, overseer 
 
Officer, officer, officer, officer 
 
Yeah, officer from overseer 
 
You need a little clarity, check the similarity 
 
The overseer rode around the plantation 
 
The officer is off, patrolling all the nation 
 
The overseer could stop you what you’re doing 
 
The officer will pull you over just when he’s pursuing 
 
The overseer had the right to get ill 
 
And if you fought back, the overseer had the right to kill 
 
The officer has the right to arrest 
 
And if you fight back they put a hole in your chest (Woop)51 
 
The lyrics of KRS-One one draw a continuous line between the 
depredations of modern day police and the practices of the overseers of 
the Antebellum South. 
                                                                                                             
51 KRS-ONE, Sound of Da Police, on RETURN OF THE BOOM BAP (Jive Records 1993). 
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The lyrics resonate in the critique of Lisa Marie Cacho who argues 
that African Americans in the inner city suffer from slavery like status—
social death—even before they are formally criminalized by arrest: 
African Americans in the inner city are not eligible for 
civil rights not only because racism is defined in law as 
personal prejudice but also because inner-city spaces are 
criminalized. Criminalization . . . not only forecloses 
empathy but also does so through producing people and 
places always already subject to a form of discrimination 
believed to be both legitimate and deserved . . . . “Their 
plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but 
that no law exists for them.”52 
The criminalization of urban areas—the post-industrial ghetto—is 
the result of forces which transformed inner city areas from once thriving 
communities to the post-industrial ghettos of today. The Bronx is a 
classic case. Blacks who moved up from the South and from the 
Caribbean were relegated to areas like the Bronx.53 Other ethnic groups 
had an industrialized New York to take up their labor and time to get an 
education and assimilate.54 But as Blacks and Hispanics moved in, the 
jobs moved out.55 Whites did as well.56 The Bronx lost half of its 
population in the sixties and seventies.57 The housing in these areas was 
already in a state of decay. By the time poor populations inhabited these 
neighborhoods, decay was no longer incipient. “Like a heavy plank 
society collapsed and the people left behind suffered the consequences.58 
The Bronx is over 90% black and Hispanic.59 Over 30% of the residents 
of the Bronx are below poverty level.60 
Rather than respond with structural reform, society responded with a 
drug war in the 1980s and war on crime beginning in the 1990s. These 
so-called wars were not waged against drugs or crime, but were waged 
                                                                                                             
52 LISA MARIE CACHO, SOCIAL DEATH: RACIALIZED RIGHTLESSNESS AND 
CRIMINALIZATION OF THE UNPROTECTED 82 (NYU Press 2012). 
53 H. V. SAVITCH, POST-INDUSTRIAL CITIES: POLITICS AND PLANNING IN NEW YORK, 
PARIS, AND LONDON 42–43 (photo. reprint 2014) (1988). See also MICHAEL N. 
DANIELSON & JAMESON W. DOIG, NEW YORK: THE POLITICS OF URBAN REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 53 (1982). 





59 Quick Facts: Bronx County (Bronx Borough), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/RHI225215/36005,00 (last visited July 23, 2016). 
60 Id.  
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against people of color in communities like the Bronx.61 This military 
mindset led to an “us vs. them” narrative which reflected popular culture 
where once one steps across the line that separates the inner city from the 
suburbs, one steps into a no man’s land populated by car-jackers, 
gangbangers, robbers and thugs. 
This stereotyping is reflected also in the astonishingly 
disproportionate way criminal laws are administered. The NYACLU 
found in their review of New York’s stop-and-frisk that in 
neighborhoods populated by people of color, blacks were three to five 
times more likely to be stopped by police.62 This is true despite the fact 
whites were almost twice as likely to possess guns.63 
It is against this background we must understand Kalief’s stop, 
arrest, and three years of incarceration without hearing or trial. It is not 
merely that the legal system treated Kalief like someone who was 
socially dead—with no recognition of his right to a speedy trial or due 
process at all—he was always and already depersonalized as a member 
of a working poor family living in a racialized and criminalized 
community in the inner city, more specifically the Bronx. To understand 
what I mean by a “racialized community” one need look no further than 
the stop-and-frisk policy of New York. In conversation with a state 
legislator, then-NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly responded 
to a question form Senator Eric Adams about the clearly disproportionate 
targeting of African American and Latino men. According to Adams, 
Kelly said, that “he targeted and focused on that group because he 
wanted to instill fear in them that every time they left their homes they 
could be targeted by police.”64 The statement takes on meaning in 
context: the NYPD stop-and-frisk campaign in the Bronx was 
specifically ruled unconstitutional on the basis of racial discrimination.65 
The social death of Browder began, in this context, when he was 
stopped by police walking down Arthur Avenue. Sometime in May 2010 
someone allegedly robbed a Mexican immigrant named Robert 
                                                                                                             
61 See JONES, supra note 31. 
62 Stop-and-Frisk Data, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/ 
content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited June 23, 2014). 
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Bautista.66 Bautista says they pursued him, pushed him against a fence, 
and took his backpack.”67 According to Bautista, “his backpack 
contained a credit card, a debit card, a digital camera and seven hundred 
dollars.”68 
We will never know what the actual facts were because no 
evidentiary hearing ever took place, much less a trial. However, we do 
know that the police version of events was inconsistent with statements 
made by the complaining witness. The original report said that the 
robbery occurred “on or about May 2” but Bautista would later say that 
the events happened on May 8. 69 
Why did the police stop Browder? Did he fit a description? Did the 
immigrant actually point him out? This raises two issues. 
When the police came up to Browder to confront him with 
allegations about “a two-week old robbery,” he was seized. He was 
deprived of his freedom of locomotion. Under Terry v. Ohio,70 this 
seizure is called a stop. All searches and seizures are presumptively 
illegal.71 To overcome the presumption, police need individualized facts 
that a crime was committed.72 Moreover, Browder and his friend 
following the stop were actually arrested. Once they were handcuffed 
and placed into the patrol car the stop became a full blown arrest.73 This 
required probable cause.74 For probable cause to exist in this situation, 
generally the complaining witness would have to have a track record of 
proving reliable tips, or he would have had to provide the police with a 
detailed description of the people who robbed him, or at least some 
unique identifying behavior or feature.75 Failing that, the police would 
need corroboration. Underlying this web of Fourth Amendment 
constraints is a basic rule: the police need individualized suspicion to 
justify a seizure or a search.76 In a just system, whenever a citizen is 
arrested, there would be a tribunal which would promptly, in matter of 
hours, make sure there was this articulable suspicion was present. 
                                                                                                             




70 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
71 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
72 Id. 
73 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 421 U.S. 291 (1980). 
74 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
75 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 269 (1983). 
76 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). 
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Such a determination was particularly important in Kalief’s case 
because misidentification is very common.77 This is especially true when 
the witness is attempting to identify a stranger of another race.78 But the 
constitution requires only that there be a “speedy trial.”79 In New York 
State the speedy trial right has been codified.80 Prosecutors have six 
months in the case of felony to bring the case to trial.81 
However, actually calculating the time is not merely a matter of 
counting days on a calendar. The United States Supreme Court has held a 
balancing test must take place.82 The equitable factors the court must 
consider issues of waiver on the part of the defendant. There are many 
other factors. In the Bronx the judges also do not count time caused by 
court suggestion. It is only the prosecutor’s lack of readiness that counts 
toward delay. Once the prosecutor files a notice of readiness the clock 
stops. 
the prosecution may also choose to announce “ready” at 
the very first appearance, the arraignment. This stops the 
speedy trial clock before it even begins, although the 
district attorney knows there is no chance of a trial 
actually taking place that day. The backlog of cases in 
the New York criminal courts means that the case will 
be put off, at least for a low level misdemeanor, for an 
average of 120 days, not a single day of which is 
charged against the speedy trial clock.83 
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Also, if the prosecution says it is not ready and requests a week, only 
the week request is counted toward the delay. However, because of a 
broken system the court delays the trial for many weeks. “Every time a 
prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder’s case, requested a one-week 
adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week 
against the six-month deadline. Meanwhile, Browder remained on 
Rikers, where six weeks still felt like six weeks—and often much 
longer.”84 
The injustice of Browder’s case is the sheer incongruity of his being 
incarcerated for three years on nothing more than an unsubstantiated 
accusation. Browder had been arrested and indicted for a felony. But an 
indictment is only an accusation. The rationale was that the delays which 
occurred were not the fault of the prosecution—but they weren’t 
Browder’s fault, either. Why was he not released? The single explanation 
that exists is that Browder was, at least tacitly, presumed guilty. And he 
was treated for all intents and purposes as if he was a guilty man. 
What happened to Browder was inconsistent with his status as a 
citizen of the United States. For him to be held at Rikers Island for three 
years without a trial, much less a conviction, sounds like something that 
could only happen in a failed state—in the third world perhaps—or in a 
totalitarian regime. 
Slavery was a totalitarian regime. It was a place where people were 
incarcerated without evidence and without trial. What made this system 
operate was the presumption that blacks were slaves, people without 
rights. 
Thus in Twelve Years a Slave, it is not clear that Burch actually knew 
that Solomon had been kidnapped. Burch claimed that Solomon was a 
slave “from Georgia.”85 It is possible that Burch believed this. The 
system of recovering fugitive slaves operated without due process. Under 
the Fugitive Slave Act, slave catchers were authorized to arrest so-called 
fugitive slaves without a warrant, take them to a federal magistrate, and 
in a “summary” proceeding get a certificate from the magistrate to take 
the slave away.86 Pennsylvania passed a law to require slave catchers to 
get a warrant from a Pennsylvania court before arresting black residents 
without due process. The law was challenged in a case called Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania.87 The Supreme Court held that Pennsylvania’s legislation 
was unconstitutional: states had no power to interfere with the recapture 
of “slaves.” This is true because only Congress could legislate in this 
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area.88 This framework operated tacitly only on the basis of presumption 
that all black people were presumed to be slaves. 
Browder was not presumed to be a slave. He was presumed to be a 
criminal. The presumption in context had a similar effect. He was treated 
as someone with no right to a trial or evidentiary hearing. The 
presumption of guilt in context relegated him to the status of a rightless 
person. 
Most people are surprised that Browder was in jail for three years. 
But his case was not unique. As Daniel Hamburg writes, “In January 
2013, seventy-three percent of all felony cases in the Bronx exceeded 
New York’s 180-day speedy trial limit, including more than 800 felonies 
still open at two years or more.”89 According to the New York Times, 
prosecutors routinely tell defense lawyers handling two and three year 
old cases that they are “too new to be dealt with.”90 Some cases are 
pending for more than five years. 
Why do the authorities allow this to go on year after year? The 
source of the problem is that the defendants in the Bronx have been 
collectively stereotyped, marked, long before any arrest takes place. In 
conventional terms they are collectively presumed guilty. But at a deeper 
level the problem is that their guilt or innocence does not matter. The 
goal of a criminal justice system is to adjudicate guilt or innocence and 
to punish the guilty. 
But the system in the Bronx is not worthy of that name. It is a police 
regime. 
The goal of the police regime seems to be one of control, 
intimidation, and lockdown of dangerous populations in the Bronx. Its 
concerns in a functional sense are efficiency and the reduction of 
threats— not individualized justice. Individuals like Kalief Browder—
marked as members of this dangerous class—are invisible to the system. 
What makes them invisible is fear. We warehouse them because it 
assuages our fear. 
In 12 Years A Slave, the slaves were hidden from view by the 
exterior elevation of a building, which made the slave pen from the 
outside appear to be a residence. A similar façade covers the Bronx 
criminal justice system.It is a façade of formal equality in which we 
assume that when a person is arrested there is probable cause, that there 
is a presumption of innocence, and that the suspect has a right to a trial. 
Behind that façade is a brutal reality of mass criminalization and 
racialized social death. 
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Solitary 
The deeper sense in which the slave was socially dead was internal. 
The slave was not only cut off from his family, denied all dignity by 
society—unseen; the slave lacked the ability to make choices for himself. 
These elements, connection with family, connection with society, ability 
to make choices for oneself, define our sense of being human. All those 
elements are lost in solitary confinement. Accordingly, those who have 
experienced it refer it in terms which suggest a sense of being physically 
alive yet dead. 
Harry Hawser, a poet and inmate at Eastern State Penitentiary in the 
1840s, called his cell “a living tomb.”91 Angela Tucker, an African 
American woman held at California’s Valley State Prison for Women in 
the 1980s, said, “It’s like living in a black hole.”92 
Lisa Guenther argues that this sense of being dead is enforced largely 
through the denial of physical interaction with others. How could I lose 
myself by being confined to myself? For this to be possible there must be 
more to selfhood than individuality. Prisoners in a super-max unit may 
have everything that individual human beings need in order to survive; 
they may even have access to “extras” such as television or closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) video conferencing with visitors. And yet there is 
something about the absence of regular bodily contact with others, the 
absence of even the possibility of touching or being touched, which 
threatens to unhinge the subject.93 
And even if the people in one’s life are not particularly sympathetic 
or supportive, it becomes difficult to bear the weight of existence in 
isolation from others. In this sense, solitary confinement makes even 
solitude impossible; isolated from social life, even one’s sense of 
individuated personhood threatens to dissolve. As a woman who 
experienced pretrial solitary confinement in Denmark explained, “The 
person subjected to solitary confinement risks losing herself and 
disappearing into a non-existence.”94 
What is relevant here is that hyper-isolation is torture. It is not 
merely sensory deprivation, it is violence. Slavery depended on violence 
to maintain the master—slave relationship—to enforce a sense of 
powerlessness. The extreme violence involved in depriving someone of 
everything they need to be human functions in the Rikers Island context 
to instill in the inmate the sense that the guards and the administration 
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have absolute power over him. Hyper-isolation is the moral and 
psychological equivalent of the overseer’s whip. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As of 2013, 4,446 inmates in local jails or state prisons died in 
custody.95 People of color were disproportionately represented. Perhaps 
the most famous is Freddie Gray, who died in custody after he was 
placed in a police van with no seat belt.96 I would argue Kalief Browder 
is like Freddie Gray: Kalief died as a result of police custody as well. In 
the case of Freddie Gray, the violence was direct, as he was thrown into a 
van, without a seat belt, and died from injuries recklessly inflicted on the 
ride to the jail. The violence which caused the death of Kalief was 
indirect, it was, in the framework of John Galtung, structural violence.97  
The concept of structural violence is “violence built into social and world 
spaces which is unintended.”98 
Structural violence here includes poverty, as well as institutional 
practices on the part of police who have militarized, over-policed, and 
engaged in systemic denials of civil rights for decades during the drug 
war and subsequently, in New York’s war against guns which targeted 
neighborhoods like the Bronx. It includes a criminal justice system 
which warehouses defendants, holding them for years without trial, 
without hope. It includes the studied indifference of the criminal justice 
system in its refusal to either see or address institutional barbarism of 
keeping an inmate never convicted of a crime, in solitary confinement for 
two of the three years he was incarcerated without trial. Structural 
violence here includes treating Kalief Browder as someone who was 
invisible, because of his intersectional status which includes at different 
times the intersection of race, class, gender, space and the fact that he 
was incarcerated at Rikers. Structural violence here includes the social 
death of Kalief Browder. 
The structural violence that Kalief Browder experienced occurred 
largely because we as a society do not see it. 
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The structural violence occurs sometimes behind the walls of jails 
like Riker’s Island, and sometimes in plain sight, as when Kalief was, I 
suspect, profiled and arrested. 
The structural violence occurs because the process of racialization—
a legacy of slavery—has so erased the status of people like Kalief 
Browder that they are not important- disposable people who do not 
matter to us. They are in a profound sense invisibilized. We do not see 
them. 
 
 
